Abstract: During the last decade, many European countries have faced sizeable immigration inflows accompanied by high prevalence of negative sentiments toward immigrants among majority members of the host societies. We propose that basic human values are one important determinant of such negative attitudes, and we seek to explain variation across countries in the strength of the effects of values. Based on Schwartz ' (1992, 1994) basic human value theory, we hypothesize that universalism values are conducive to positive attitudes toward immigration, while conformity-tradition reinforce anti-immigration sentiments. We furthermore hypothesize that these value effects are moderated by two contextual variables. Both value effects are expected to be weaker in countries with a higher level of cultural embeddedness. Furthermore, negative effects of conformity-tradition values are hypothesized to be cushioned by a lower proportion of immigrants in the country. A multilevel analysis of data from 24 countries from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008)(2009) 
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Introduction
European countries have faced a constant increase of immigration in recent decades (Hooghe, Trappers, Meuleman and Reeskens 2008) . Approximately 3.4 million people immigrated into countries belonging to the EU-27 in 2004, the number increased to 3.8 million in 2008, and this trend appears to be continuing. 1 Not surprisingly, substantial sociological research has been devoted to understanding the consequences and implications of this upsurge in migration. Much of this research has focused on one implication that is considered particularly worrisome, i.e., the level of anti-immigrant sentiment among members of the host societies. Several studies reveal a rapid rise and/or a high level of anti-foreigner sentiment:
Substantial proportions of the population of host societies favor denying equal rights to immigrants and perceive them as a threat to social cohesion and order, culture, and traditions, and their economic well-being (Raijman, Davidov, Schmidt, and Hochman 2008; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Schlüter, Schmidt, and Wagner 2008) . In many European countries the popularity of anti-immigrant politicians or parties has risen and public opinion has shifted to a less welcoming position (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002) .
Previous research has sought to delineate the mechanisms underlying the genesis of negative attitudes of majority members toward immigrants. It has focused on both individual and contextual determinants of such attitudes. A first line of research maintains that socioeconomic vulnerability, reflected in low education levels, weak labor market positions, and economic deprivation, accounts for the negative attitudes. Various studies have tested these propositions with international datasets like the European Social Survey and conclude that vulnerable individuals fear losing their jobs due to competition from newcomers to the labor market who are willing to accept lower wages (Gorodzeisky 2011; Kunovich 2004; ENDNOTES Pichler 2010; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003; Semyonov and Glikman 2009; Semoyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 2008) . Yet some studies also demonstrate reductions of perceived threat due to contact with immigrants (e.g., Semyonov and Glikman, 2009 ).
A second line of research proposes that ideological dispositions are an important source of anti-immigrant attitudes and that political conservatism mobilizes negative sentiments that induce hostility to and prejudice against immigrants. Empirical studies have demonstrated repeatedly that right-wing individuals tend to reject immigration more strongly (Gorodzeisky 2011; Raijman et al. 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006 Semyonov et al. , 2008 .
A third set of studies explains the emergence of anti-immigrant prejudice as due to contextual variables that affect negative attitudes directly or that moderate the effects of individual-level variables. These studies suggest that unfavorable economic conditions on the country level accompanied by large-scale immigration are perceived as a threat to the economy and may induce hostile attitudes (Gorodzeisky 2011; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet, 2009; Pichler 2010; Quillian 1995 Quillian , 1996 Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006 ). Other contextual variables identified as sources of hostile attitudes are negative media coverage (Schlüter and Davidov 2011) and national immigration policies (Schlüter, Meuleman and Davidov 2013; Weldon 2006) .
In recent years, a number of authors have also noted the important role that human values play in the explanation of negative attitudes toward immigrants (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt 2008a; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2006a Schwartz , 2007 . These studies adopted Schwartz' (1992) definition of basic human values as beliefs about the importance of broad goals as guiding principles in life. They used individual differences in values to explain negative attitudes toward immigrants over and above the effects of social structural position. Values are found to exert robust effects, some of which varied across countries.
Research has yet to examine the conditions that affect the influence of basic human values on attitudes toward immigration, that is, the circumstances under which values contribute more or less to the explanation of anti-immigrant sentiments. Nor have researchers proposed a theory that might explain the variation in value effects across countries. This study investigates variation in the effects of values on attitudes toward immigration across 24
European countries from different European regions. We will argue that an aspect of cultural values-cultural embeddedness (Schwartz 2006) , that is, the extent to which individuals in the society are expected to strive toward shared goals rather than their own-serves as a moderator of the impact of values on anti-immigration attitudes. By trying to explain variation in the effect of individual values on attitudes toward immigration across countries in a systematic way, our study contributes to a better understanding of the conditions under which values are more prominent in explaining negative sentiments toward immigration.
To test these hypotheses empirically, we utilize an internationally comparable dataset that includes large samples from many European countries, the European Social Survey (ESS; Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, and Gillian 2007) . We derive latent variables that take measurement errors into account (Bollen 1989) for our main theoretical constructs, and we test the equivalence of our constructs across countries (Billiet 2003) . Testing for construct equivalence has rarely been practiced in studies that apply multilevel analysis, although such equivalence is a necessary condition for a meaningful interpretation of multilevel analyses (Kim, Kwok, and Yoon 2012) . Before turning to the empirical analyses, we present the theoretical background and propositions of the study.
Theoretical considerations

The value theory
Human values are 'desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity' (Schwartz 1994: 21) .
Individuals' values are ordered in a hierarchy of importance that is quite stable across time and situations. 2 . Schwartz (1992) 3 has postulated that the full range of values recognized across societies form a motivational continuum; extensive research in over 80 countries has supported this theory that distinguishes 10 values (universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction). We will focus on the two values universalism and the unified value conformity-tradition, because they have been found to predict attitudes toward immigration 4 (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 2008a; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2007 In contrast to values, attitudes are not ordered hierarchically, are less stable, and refer to positive and negative evaluations of objects rather than to the importance of goals (Rokeach 1968; Schwartz 2006a) . Values, but not attitudes, serve as standards to judge people, actions, and events.
for three reasons. First, Schwartz (1992 Schwartz ( , 1994 ) makes a better theoretical and empirical distinction between values and attitudes. Such a distinction is crucial for using values to explain attitudes and for guaranteeing discriminant validity between the concepts. Second, Schwartz makes a clear distinction between individual-level and societal-level values whereas Inglehart does not make such a distinction on the measurement level. We propose mechanisms to explain attitudes toward immigration on the individual level. Therefore, the Schwartz theory is better suited to test them empirically. Finally, the database we chose to test our propositions is the European Social Survey, which includes measures of anti-immigrant sentiments across a large set of European countries. This dataset included measurements for Schwartz' rather than Inglehart's values. See Becker, Siegers, and Kuntz (2012) and Datler, Jagodzinski, and Schmidt (in press ) for a discussion about differences between the two theories. 4 In many empirical studies it was not possible to distinguish between tradition and conformity (see, e.g., Davidov 2010) . Therefore, we decided to unify them in this study. This does not contradict the theory due to their shared motivation and proximal location in the value space. We did not use security as a predictor because of the different meaning it may have across countries which may lead to conceptual confusion. Furthermore, in additional exploratory analyses, security only has a relatively small effect because of its close content to conformity and tradition.
What mechanism links values to attitudes toward immigration? Values whose expression, attainment, or motivation may be promoted or blocked by immigration to a country are likely to affect attitudes toward immigration (Sagiv and Schwartz 1995 tradition, and conformity on attitudes toward immigration in numerous countries (e.g., Davidov et al. 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2007 ). The current study will provide a rigorous test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 by trying to replicate the finding across 24 countries. But at the same time, we take current knowledge a step further by addressing the following questions: How do value effects vary across countries, and how can this variation be explained?
Variability in value effects
The above hypotheses and the reasoning underlying them are stated as applicable across societies. We expect, however, that the strength of the effects of these basic human values varies across societies. In order for values to affect attitudes and behavior, they must be activated in specific situations or contexts (Schwartz 2006a) . Contextual variables are likely to influence the intensity with which values relevant to immigration attitudes are activated.
The first contextual variable we consider is cultural embeddedness, a cultural dimension for comparing societies (Schwartz 2006b ). In so-called 'embedded cultures', people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals rather than pursuing one's own goals.
Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining individuals' actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. In contrast, in less embedded cultures, people are viewed as autonomous entities who are encouraged to cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and to find meaning in their own uniqueness.
Embeddedness assumes that a person's roles in and obligations to collectivities are more important than her unique ideas and aspirations, and in less embedded societies individuals are encouraged to express their uniqueness and independence in thought, action, and feelings (Schwartz 2006b ). As such, cultural embeddedness should be distinguished from Hofstede's (2001) concept of collectivism: Whereas collectivism refers to the way in which individuals and the surrounding group are actually related, embeddedness refers in addition to the norms that dictate how they should be related.
5
5 Our choice to focus on cultural embeddedness rather than on collectivism is not only justified based on theoretical considerations, but is also supported by empirical arguments. We reproduced the analyses presented This analytical framework implies that individuals' personal values are more likely to be salient, to be activated rather than suppressed, and to influence their attitudes and behavior in societies with less embedded cultures. Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000: 11) also inferred that 'value orientations are … predictive for choices… in contexts with … high degrees of individual autonomy'. On these bases, we hypothesize that values have stronger effects on attitudes toward immigration in less embedded societies (H3).
Our second contextual variable is the proportion of immigrants in a country. Group threat theory posits that people who live in conditions of intense competition for scarce goods are more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat (Stephan et al. 2005; Coenders 2001; Scheepers et al. 2002; Quillian 1995 Quillian , 1996 . A high proportion of immigrants in a country has been associated with negative attitudes toward immigration at the country level Semyonov et al. 2006) . We hypothesize that this is also the case across the 24
European countries we study here (H4). Empirical evidence for an effect of the proportion of immigrants on attitudes toward immigration is mixed with some authors finding support while others do not. For example, Quillian (1995 Quillian ( , 1996 or Coenders, Gijsberts and Scheepers (2004) found supportive evidence for the effect of immigrant group size, but Semyonov, Raijman, Yom-Tov, and Schmidt (2004) or Strabac and Listhaug (2008) did not. The test of
Hypothesis 4 in the current study provides a rigorous test of this effect across numerous
countries.
Yet more central to the purpose of this study, we hypothesize that the higher the proportion of immigrants in the country, the stronger the negative effect of conformity and tradition on attitudes toward immigration will be (H5). As noted above, immigration threatens the attainment of these values by introducing new and unfamiliar practices and beliefs. It below using collectivism as a moderator for value effects (results not shown but are available upon request). Cross-level interactions for collectivism are insignificant (with Tradition-Conformity) or considerably weaker than is the case for cultural embeddedness.
increases the number of people who may question or violate common norms and conventions.
The greater the proportion of immigrants from dissimilar cultural backgrounds, the greater the pressure for change in the societal institutions that people who emphasize conformity and tradition values cherish. Hence, we expect that these values will then show a stronger relationship with anti-immigration sentiment.
There is mixed evidence for an effect of immigration levels on relations of values to immigration attitudes. Davidov et al. (2008a) found that values had a weaker effect on attitudes in countries with higher immigration levels. But Davidov and Meuleman (2012) found no variation across countries that differed in immigration levels in the effects of conservation values on immigration attitudes. Immigration levels are not equivalent to the proportion of immigrants. However, the two are sufficiently related so that the mixed findings 3. Data and measurement
Data
The analyses utilize the data of the fourth round (2008) (2009) to 4 (allow none). We recoded responses so that higher scores indicate greater willingness to allow immigrants into the country. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Bollen 1989; Jöreskog 1971 ) demonstrated that the three questions load positively and strongly on a single factor. These questions were averaged to form an index that we named Allow.
Values. The ESS Human Values Scale is a modification of the Portrait Values
Questionnaire (Schwartz 2007 We used the three universalism items that tap the importance of tolerance, equality, and environmental concern, two tradition items that tap the importance of tradition, customs, religion, and modesty, and two conformity items that tap the importance of following rules, doing what one is told, and behaving properly. In CFA analyses, all items loaded strongly on their respective value factor. We therefore averaged the items to form two indices that we named Universalism (UN) and Conformity-Tradition (COTR).
Cultural Embeddedness. In each country, we utilized scores based on responses of urban school teachers and university students to the Schwartz Value Survey (for details see To rule out the possibility that this distorts our conclusions, we replicated all analyses in this paper excluding Estonia and Latvia. Results (available upon request) are virtually identical, and do not alter the conclusions.
self-placement on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale. Finally, religiosity was measured by responses to the question "…how religious would you say you are?" on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious).
Modeling strategy
We used multilevel analysis to take account of the two-level structure of the data, where individuals are nested within countries. We estimated a series of increasingly more complex models as proposed by Hox (2010 We estimated all models with the restricted maximum likelihood procedure implemented in SPSS 19. To deal with item nonresponse, we used multiple imputation (Rubin 1996; Schafer 1997) . All variables were standardized (over the pooled dataset), so all effects can be interpreted as standardized effects (Hox 2010; Snijders and Bosker 1994) .
Furthermore, the two value scales were group-mean centered (Hox 2010: 68) before standardization, in order to avoid confusion between processes operating at the individual and country level. This procedure guarantees that the interaction effects we observe are actually cross-level interactions (as our theoretical framework predicts) rather than interactions at the country level (Hofmann and Gavin 1998).
Results
Testing for equivalence
As a first step, we ensured that our measurement of attitudes toward immigration and of individual values of universalism and conformity-tradition, our main constructs, were equivalent across countries (Billiet 2003 Willingness to accept immigrants varied substantially across countries. Attitudes were most positive in Sweden, followed by Poland, Norway, Germany, and Bulgaria. Rejection of immigration was strongest in Greece followed by Latvia, Hungary, Portugal, and to a lesser extent, Cyprus and the Czech Republic. As shown in Table 1 , the mean willingness score varied considerably across countries. The difference between the most (Sweden) and least (Greece) positive country was 1.46, which is considerable knowing that this is a standardized variable. The multilevel analysis sheds light on the sources of variation in willingness to accept immigrants both within countries and between them. 9 The full analyses are available from the first author.
Embeddedness varied considerably across countries as well. Scores were highest in Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Poland and lowest in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark. In the former countries we expect values to exert stronger effects whereas in the latter we expect them to operate less strongly.
Multilevel analysis
The results of the series of multilevel model analyses are reported in Tables 2 (Models 1 -4) and 3 (Models 5 -7). Model 2 regressed Allow (the index of attitude toward immigration) on the sociodemographic variables gender, age, education, and subjective income. Compared to the empty model, the individual-and country-level variances dropped by 5.0% and 17%, respectively, indicating that these variables explain considerable variance on both levels of analysis. Women and those with higher education and income were more positive toward immigration whereas older people were considerably more negative. These findings are in line with what has been reported in the literature (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2006) . Model 4 added the macro-level variables, cultural embeddedness levels, and percentage of non-EU residents in each country, in order to examine their effect on variation between countries in attitudes toward immigration. Based on group threat theory (Quillian 1995 (Quillian , 1996 , we hypothesized that greater proportions of immigrants in a country would increase competitive threat and, therefore, lead to rejecting immigration. This hypothesis was not confirmed; proportion of immigrants in a country did not account for significant betweencountry variability in attitudes to immigration. We had no reason to expect a direct effect of cultural embeddedness on attitudes toward immigration, nor did the analysis reveal such an effect. Thus, neither contextual variable had a direct effect on attitudes toward immigration. immigration more strongly in countries with larger immigrant populations, confirming our fifth hypothesis. This fits the theoretical argument that a larger proportion of immigrants in a country increases the potential for societal change, intensifying the threat experienced by people for whom it is especially important to preserve convention, social norms, and customs.
Consequently, these people reject immigration even more strongly in countries with large proportions of immigrants. Sixteen percent of the variability in the effect of conformitytradition on attitudes toward immigration was explained by this cross-level interaction.
Model 7, finally, includes all three cross-level interactions simultaneously. The finding that the results are virtually identical to those of Models 6a-6c essentially corroborates the robustness of the results.
The full set of findings reveals that universalism and conformity-tradition values exert strong effects on attitudes toward immigrants in many different countries. Moreover, the strength of these effects varies significantly across countries. This variation depends to a substantial extent on the level of cultural embeddedness and the proportion of non-EU immigrants in each country.
Summary and conclusions
European countries have faced a constant increase of immigration in recent decades, accompanied by a rapid rise in and/or a high level of anti-foreigner sentiment. In many
European countries the popularity of anti-immigrant politicians or parties has risen and public opinion has shifted to a less welcoming position. This study built upon previous studies that have shown the important role of basic human values as determinants of negative attitudes to immigrants. We hypothesized that more positive attitudes toward immigration would be found among individuals who give higher priority to universalism values, and contrastingly, more negative attitudes would be found among individuals who give higher priority to conformity-tradition values. The present study sought to explain variation across countries in these effects of values on attitudes. We identified two contextual variables likely to explain this variation, cultural embeddedness and proportion of immigrants in the population. We expected cultural embeddedness to play an important role in moderating these effects across countries.
We hypothesized that the effects of the two basic individual values are weaker in societies whose culture is higher on embeddedness (vs. autonomy). The rationale behind this cross-level interaction is that in more embedded societies, people are socialized and encouraged to maintain group solidarity and to find meaning in life through identifying with and pursuing the goals of the groups of which they are members. In less embedded societies they are socialized and encouraged to cultivate their own unique preferences and ideas and to pursue their own personal goals. Thus, personal values are more likely to be salient, readily activated, and hence to influence attitudes more in less embedded societies. We further hypothesized that the negative effect of conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward immigration is stronger in countries with a higher percentage of immigrants. Immigrants potentially threaten the maintenance of accepted customs, traditions, and norms, and the larger the proportion of immigrants the greater the threat to the status quo. This threat directly challenges the goals of conformity-tradition values and is, therefore, likely to activate them as sources of influence on attitudes.
To test our hypotheses, we utilized the data of 24 European countries from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008) (2009) . We analyzed the data with multilevel models because we wished to examine effects at both the individual and country level and to test cross-level interactions. Because constructs are not comparable across countries unless their measurement is equivalent, we used multigroup confirmatory factor analysis to establish the necessary metric and partial scalar equivalence of the value and attitude constructs. This permitted meaningful interpretation of the multilevel analysis.
The analyses largely supported the hypotheses. Previous findings of significant effects of universalism, conformity, and tradition values on attitudes toward immigration were replicated. Universalism values predicted more positive attitudes and conformity-tradition values predicted more negative attitudes. These effects were robust in the sense that they were significantly positive (for universalism) and negative (for conformity-tradition) in virtually all countries. Nonetheless, the strength of these value effects varied across countries. The hypothesized effects of the two country-level contextual variables on the strength of value effects were supported by the data. In countries with less embedded cultures, both values had stronger effects than in countries with more embedded cultures. Moreover, in countries with higher proportions of non-EU immigrants, the effect on attitudes of conformity-tradition values was stronger. The proportion of non-EU immigrants in a country had no direct effect on attitudes toward immigration, replicating previous studies (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2004; Strabac and Listhaug 2008) .
The findings demonstrated that individuals' values play an important role in the explanation of attitudes toward immigration even after controlling their sociodemographic characteristics. Indeed, underlining the significance of values, their effects were stronger than the effects of the sociodemographic characteristics in standardized terms. Thus, when designing policies to increase public support for immigration, values within the population should be taken into account. Values are largely shaped and crystallized during adolescence and remain relatively stable thereafter, barring major traumas or therapy (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Inglehart 1997) . This suggests that policies should be aimed at young people in order to affect the impact of values on attitudes to immigration.
The findings for cultural embeddedness demonstrate that this cultural dimension does not affect attitudes directly. However, its importance and that of the proportion of immigrants in the society may primarily be through increasing or decreasing the likelihood that the values relevant to attitudes will be activated. Indeed, individuals' personal values are more likely to be salient, to be activated rather than suppressed, and to influence their attitudes and behavior in societies with less embedded cultures. Our findings suggest that the individual level effects of values are highly robust, yet they are nonetheless moderated. This is study is not without limitations. In particular, our conclusions regarding the cross-level interaction might be challenged by the fact that this dimension of national culture correlates substantively with other contextual variables, such as a lower GDP, a lower human development index (HDI), poorer education on average, and having a communist past. Such factors may have reduced the quality of responses to the values questionnaire in high embedded countries and as a result could account for the moderation. Unfortunately, the small sample size at the country level does not allow us to control for these factors and to rule out the possibility that the cross-level interaction is spurious.
Our findings suggest that variability across countries in attitudes toward immigration may be accounted for to a large extent by variability in individual values combined with the level of cultural embeddedness and size of the immigrant population in the country. However, to understand shifts in such attitudes over time, we may need other explanations. Values tend to display high stability over time and do not offer a convincing mechanism for studying longitudinal change in anti-immigrant sentiments. Studies suggest instead that worsening economic conditions (Semyonov et al. 2006 (Semyonov et al. , 2008 , immigration policies (Schlüter et al. 2013) or change in media coverage (Schlüter and Davidov 2011) may offer, at least in part, explanations for such longitudinal variation in negative attitudes toward immigration.
Given the continuing increase of immigration around the world and the persistence and growth of negative attitudes toward immigration, it is critical to understand the sources of these attitudes. Promoting positive attitudes toward immigration may be beneficial both for immigrants and for their receiving societies. In the long run, immigration has generally strengthened societies economically (Borjas 1995; Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls 2010) , but opposition from members of the host society undermines social cohesion. In the present study we have (1) identified two relevant values that could be targets of socialization, (2) suggested mechanisms through which these values influence attitudes, and (3) investigated the circumstances in which these mechanisms operate more strongly. Theorizing that identifies other relevant variables and that investigates possible cross-national variation in their effects on attitudes toward immigration is needed. Equally important, it is necessary to deal with the methodological issue of equivalence of measurement when studying these new variables. By ensuring this critical prerequisite, we were able to study the effects of values on a key attitude across countries and to draw reliable conclusions. Note: The Allow, Universalism, and Conformity-Tradition scales are standardized (Note that in the multilevel models, the value scales were group-mean centered before standardizing in order to guarantee that the interactions with context variables are due to actual cross-level interactions rather than macro-level processes). Multiple imputation is used to handle missing data. All entries are standardized effects.
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